Abstract-In heterogeneous sensor networks (HSNs), which use existing key predistribution schemes, network security will significantly decline with time. In this paper, a continuous secure scheme is proposed based on two-dimensional backward key chains. In the scheme, powerful sensors do not need to be equipped with tamper-resistant hardware. Analysis and simulations indicate that the proposed scheme can significantly improve the performance of existing schemes in resilience against node capture attacks throughout the lifecycle of static HSNs.
summmarized as follows: (1) We are the first to apply twodimensional backward key chains technique [11] to HSNs; (2) n disjoint and interrelated key pools are constructed; (3) A new key predistribution scheme is proposed. Analysis and simulations indicate that the proposed scheme can significantly improve the performance of existing schemes in continuous secure of static HSNs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related work. Section III presents our scheme, and Section IV analyzes the scheme. Section V concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
For sensor networks (SNs), the basic scheme [8] was proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor, in which each sensor picks some keys randomly from a large key pool before deployment. Two sensors can establish a shared key, if they have at least one common key. To enhance the security of the basic scheme against small-scale attacks, q-composite scheme was proposed [9] , in which q common keys are required for two nodes to establish a shared key. To improve the network resilience against node capture throughout the lifecycle of SNs, Zhou et al. proposed a secure scheme using deployment knowledge [10] . Li et al. proposed a continuous secure scheme based on two-dimensional backward key chains [11] .
For HSNs, Du et al. proposed AP-D scheme based on an asymmetric predistribution key management (AP) method. In the AP method, an L-sensor and an H-sensor pick t 1 and t 2 ( t 1 t 2 ) keys from a large key pool respectively before deployment. Two nodes can establish a shared key through either the basic scheme [8] or the q-composite scheme [9] . Lu et al. proposed a key management scheme (AP-L) using AP method [4] . In AP-L, the key pool of L-sensors is a subset of the key pool of H-sensors. In the two schemes [3] - [4] , all nodes choose their keys from the same key pool. An attacker can easily obtain a large number of keys by capturing a small fraction of nodes, which can make HSN ineffective in continuous security. To improve the performance in continuous security, constructing disjoint and interrelated key pools is a simple and suitable method.
III. CSS-SH SCHEME
Clusters are formed in HSNs. Clustering-base schemes are promising techniques for sensor networks because of their good scalability and support for data aggregation. For HSNs, it is natural to let powerful H-sensors serve as cluster heads and form clusters around them [13] . The formation of clusters in HSNs is as follows: Each L-sensor selects an H-sensor whose Hello message has the best signal strength as its cluster head. Simultaneously each L-sensor also records other Hsensors from which it has received Hello messages, and these 1089-7798/13$31.00 c 2013 IEEE H-sensors will serve as backup cluster heads in the case that the cluster head fails. In a cluster, the cluster head can communicate with all L-sensors directly, but an L-sensor may need one or more hops to communicate with its cluster head. Cluster heads, which are farther away from the Base Station (BS), can communicate with the BS through hop-by-hop with the help of neighboring cluster heads. In CSS-SH, we make use of the following assumptions:
1. Nodes to be deployed in the target field are not mobile i.e., the heterogeneous sensor network is static.
2. Only a limited number of nodes may be compromised by an attacker during the short time period of the direct key establishment phase [14] .
3. BS will not be compromised by an attacker. CSS-SH has three phases: key predistribution, shared key establishment, and path key establishment.
A. Two-dimensional backward key chain
In [11] , a two-dimensional backward key chain is constructed (see figure 1) . For a two-dimensional backward key chain C j , if the key k i1 j is known, the key k i2 j (i 2 ≤ i 1 ), the generation key g i2 j and the first key k (i2,0) j of the second dimensional key chain can be calculated as follows, respectively:
where H 1 and H 2 are two independent hash functions. So, the key k (i2,l2) j (l 2 ≥ 1) can be computed as follows:
If the keys k i1 j and k (i2,l1) j are known, the key k (i2,l2) j (l 1 < l 2 )can be computed using the following equation:
B. Key pool
The key pool consists of m two-dimensional backward hash key chains, which is divided into n disjoint sub-key pools. A sub-key P i consists of two parts: a generation key pool P
C. Key pre-distribution phase
This stage is performed offline before nodes are deployed. BS is predistributed a master key k BS and all keys of the key pool P 
, and a i1 can calculate these keys by using the methods in section III-A and section III-D; 2. x 2 ordinary keys which come from the ordinary key pool P 
,ID b i 2 ), a i1 can calculate these keys using the methods in section III-A and section III-D. As a result, if the number of common keys is more than 0, i.e. x 1 + x 2 ≥ 1, the shared key between a i1 and b i2 is hashed by all common keys.
E. Path key establishment phase
If direct shared key establishment between two H-sensors fails, the procedure of the path key establishment is the same as the schemes [8] - [9] 
IV. PERFORMANCE AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the performance and the security of our scheme, including the probability that an H-sensor can establish a shared key with an L-sensor in its cluster, and the probability that communications between an H-sensor and Lsensors in its cluster can be compromised by an attacker by the information retrieved from the X compromised nodes. For the sake of the analytical convenience, we suppose that nodes are distributed in the HSN randomly, and an attacker captures nodes from the HSN randomly. N (3) where i ≥ k and N
Similarly, after the k th capture, the expectation value of L-sensors, which are deployed in the i th phase and are not captured, is: (4) where i ≥ k and N
A. Performance analysis
In CSS-SH, after the shared key establishment phase, keys from the key pool P i 1 saved in a node are hashed. Therefore, the probability that an L-sensor L i1 can establish a shared key with an H-sensor H i1 is influenced by the time that they are deployed. The probability can be calculated using the following equation:
where
, and
Therefore, in the k th deployment phase, the probability that an H-sensor can establish a pairwise key with an L-sensor is:
B. Security analysis
The probability that a shared key, which is established using x 1 generation keys from the key pool P i 1 and is compromised, can be calculated as follows: (7) where N i CH−B and N i CL−B are the number of H-sensors and L-sensors which are deployed in the i th phase and are captured during the bootstrapping phase, respectively. Similarly, the probability that a pairwise key, which is established using x 2 ordinary keys from the key pool P i 2 and is compromised, can be calculated as follows: (8) So, the probability that a pairwise key between an H-sensor and an L-sensor in its cluster is compromised can be calculated as follows:
C. Comparisons
In this section, performance and security between our scheme and AP-L, and AP-D, are compared. For the sake of fairness, in AP-L and AP-D, predistribution keys are hashed as soon as the pairwise key establishment ends. The settings of our experiments can be summarized as follows.
1. Deployment area is 600m×600m.
2. The number of L-sensors and H-sensors is 5,700 and 300, respectively.
3. Node deployment includes 5 phases. In the first phase, there are 1,900 L-sensors and 100 H-sensors deployed, respectively. In each subsequent phase, it is assumed that there are 950 L-sensors and 50 H-sensors deployed, respectively. There are 950 L-sensors and 50 H-sensors compromised in each phase.
4. The number of key chains is 5,000 (m=5,000), and the length of forward key chains is 100 (L=100). Fig. 2 . The probability of sharing key comparisons. In AP-L, the size of the key pool is 8,000. In AP-D, the size of the key pool for L-sensors, namely P L , is 7,000, and the size of the key pool for H-sensors, namely P H (P H ⊃ P L ), is 8,000. In AP-L and AP-D, the number of keys predistributed to an L-sensor and an H-sensor is 30 and 500, respectively. 5. The number of keys predistributed to an L-sensor and an H-sensor are 30 and 500, respectively.
6. During the bootstrapping phase, the number of captured L-sensors and H-sensors is 20 and 2, respectively. Figure 2 shows that the probability of shared key establishment in the second phase is less than that in the first phase. The larger the deployment phase, the smaller the decline is. For example: from the first phase to the second phase, and from the third phase to the fourth phase, the decline of the probability of shared key establishment is 0.04 and 0.003, respectively. At the same time, compared with scheme AP-L and AP-D, the proba-bility of shared key establishment in CSS-SH is highest.
In AP-D and AP-L, the key pool is fixed. Therefore, increases in the number of captured nodes diminish network resilience. For example, for the scheme AP-D, Figure 3 shows the probability that a shared key is compromised in the first phase and the 5 th phase is 0.06 and 0.36, respectively. In our scheme, the sub-key pool of the i th phase and the phase is disjoint, that is, P i ∩ P i = ∅ (i = i ). Therefore, our scheme can improve the performance in continuous secure. As an example, in CSS-SH, the probability that shared keys are compromised in the 5 th phase is 0.16.
V. CONCLUSION
In the paper, we proposed a continuous secure scheme for static heterogeneous sensor networks. H-sensors do not need to be equipped with tamper-resistant hardware. Analysis and simulations indicate that the probability that shared keys are compromised drops slightly with time. For example, when the settings of CSS-SH is the same as the section IV-C, in the 5 th phase, the probability that shared keys are compromised is only 0.16. Compared with schemes AP-D and AP-L, the continuous secure of CSS-SH scheme is more than double.
